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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, Case No. 950277-CA 
-vs - : 
BRET RAY ARBON and Priority No 10 
KIMBERLY SUE MILLIGAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Defendants' motions to 
dismiss prosecutions against them for driving under the influence in violation of Section 41-
6-44, Utah Code Ann. (1953), in the Second Judicial Circuit Court for Davis County, the 
Honorable K. Roger Bean, presiding. This Court has jursidiction to hear this appeal by virtue 
of Sections 77-18a-l(l)(c) and 78-2a-3(2)(d)and(e), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT DUI PROSECUTION IS 
BARRED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS BY A 
PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE DRIVER'S LICENSE 
SUSPENSION HEARING. 
The issue presented is a question of law, and the decision of the Circuit Court 
is reviewed by this Court for correctness. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993). 
The issue was raised and preserved in the trial court by the Defendants' motions to dismiss 
on double jeopardy grounds, which motions were denied by the trial court's orders included 
in the Addendum herein. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
" . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." U.S. Const. Amend. V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course and Disposition Below 
Each of the Defendants was charged criminally with driving under the 
influence. Prior to trial, both filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution 
constituted double jeopardy because it followed an administrative driver's license suspension 
hearing. The trial court denied the motions, and Defendants immediately petitioned this 
Court for permission to appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
In each of the two cases consolidated in this appeal, the Defendant was arrested 
for driving under the influence. Pursuant to §53-3-223 Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1994), an 
administrative hearing was held to determine whether the driver's license of each Defendant 
should be suspended based upon the arrest. Criminal charges were also brought against each 
of the defendants for driving under the influence; these charges arose from the same 
incidents for which the administrative suspension hearings had been held. 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A civil sanction that has any retributive or deterrent effect is punishment for 
purposes of double jeopardy analysis, and a criminal prosecution subsequent to the attempted 
imposition of such a sanction is barred by the Fifth Amendment. Whether the sanction in 
question has or is intended to have some remedial aspect does not remove it from the 
characterization as punishment if it also has some deterrent or retributive effect. 
POINT II 
Although the administrative suspension of a driver's license may arguably have 
some remedial purpose or effect, is also has deterrent and retributive effects, and is therefore 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. A subsequent criminal prosecution is therefore 
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; IF THE ATTEMPT TO SUSPEND 
APPELLANTS' DRIVER'S LICENSES HAS ANY 
RETRIBUTIVE OR DETERRENT EFFECT, IT IS 
PUNISHMENT, AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY BARS THIS 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. 
3 
This case concerns that aspect of double jeopardy protection which prohibits 
a second attempt to impose punishment: 
This Court many times has held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple 
punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper. 490 
U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Halper was a health care administrator who over billed the Government on 65 
Medicare claims by representing that $12.00 services had been provided on each claim when 
in fact only $3.00 services were furnished. He was convicted criminally, sent to prison and 
fined $5,000. Then the Government brought a civil False Claims Act case against him 
seeking the statutory penalty of $2,000 per claim, or $130,000. On Halper's appeal the 
Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: 
We turn, finally, to the unresolved question implicit in our 
cases: whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty 
may constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 490 U.S. at 446. 
Holding that the statutory penalty as applied to Halper violates the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, the Halper court formulated a new test for determining whether a 
civil sanction constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes: 
(A) civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, 
as we have come to understand that term. 490 U.S. at 448 
(emphasis added). 
4 
This test, applied in Halper to a statutory civil penalty on double jeopardy 
grounds, was applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate a civil forfeiture under the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment in Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 
2801 (1993).1 
There is language in Halper, frequently embraced by prosecutors, that created 
confusion about what the Court will deem punishment: 
(U)nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who has been 
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an 
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction 
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution. 490 U.S. at 448-449. 
Does Halper say that a civil sanction is punitive when it is only a deterrent or retribution, and 
that any remedial aspect will save the sanction from the characterization as punishment? Or 
does Halper say that even if a civil sanction has some remedial aspect, if it also has any 
element of deterrence or retribution, it will be punishment for double jeopardy purposes? 
This question was settled in Austin v. U.S., supra. The Government had argued 
in that case that civil forfeiture statutes had remedial aspects, and that the statutes therefore 
1
 In the court below, the State argued that the definition of "punishment" differs for 
purposes of Fifth Amendment double jeopardy and Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis, 
citing Austin and Halper for that proposition. A careful reading of Austin, however, reveals that 
the Supreme Court applied the Halper standards. The Ninth Circuit has recently recognized the 
Supreme Court's identical approach in defining "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy and 
Excessive Fines clauses, holding that if a forfeiture constitutes punishment under Halper criteria, 
it constitutes punishment for purposes of both clauses. United States v. $405.089.23 U.S. 
Currency. 33 Fed.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) at 1219. 
5 
could not be characterized as punishment. The Supreme Court, expressly applying the 
punishment analysis of Halper to the forfeiture statutes, observed: 
Fundamentally, even assuming that (the forfeiture statutes) serve 
some remedial purpose, the Government's argument must fail. 
"(A) civil sanction that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial 
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have 
come to understand that term." Halper, 490 U.S., at 448 
{emphasis added}. 113 Sup.Ct. at 2812. 
(W)e are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve 
more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that 
a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is 
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, 
however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving 
in part to punish. We said in Halper that wCa civil sanction that 
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or 
deterrent purposes, is punishment" (citation omitted). 113 S. 
Ct. at 2806. 
Under United States v. Halper . . . the question is whether 
forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not exclude the 
possibility that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that 
conclusion. 113 S. Ct. at 2810 n. 12. 
This interpretation of the meaning of Halper's test to determine whether a civil 
sanction is punishment has also been adopted by the Ninth Circuit: 
Just last year (the Supreme Court) reaffirmed its new-found 
wisdom, emphasizing again that a sanction which is designed 
even in part to deter or punish will constitute punishment, 
regardless of whether it also has a remedial purpose. See 
Austin v. U.S., 113 Sup.Ct. 2801, 2806, 2812 (1993). United 
States v. $405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 Fed.3d 1210, 1219 
(1994) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted this view of the meaning of Halper.2 
These cases require that the attempt by the State of Utah to suspend Appellants' 
driver's hcenses must be completely free from any retributive or deterrent effect in order to 
avoid the characterization as punishment. Whether the administrative suspension hearing3 
is civil, criminal or both has no bearing on this issue: 
This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its 
violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the 
actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of 
the state... (I)n determining whether a particular civil sanction 
constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually 
served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of 
the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be 
evaluated. Halper. supra, at 447 n. 7. 
It is therefore not the stated legislative purpose,4 nor any civil-criminal 
distinction,5 that will determine whether the sanction in this case is punishment, but rather 
the character of the sanction and the purpose it actually serves. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch. 511 U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), has been widely cited in nationwide 
proceedings involving the precise issue presented on this appeal. The case, however, is of 
2
 State v. A House and 1.37 Acres. 886 P. 2d 534 (Utah 1994), discussed below at page 
11. 
3
 Commonly referred to as &per se hearing. 
4
 As expressed in §53-3-222, Utah Code Ann., as enacted by Laws, 1983, set out on 
page 9 below. 
5
 See, e.g., Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979); City of 
Orem v. CrandalL 760 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1988). 
7 
only limited application here, because the Supreme Court in Kurth Ranch specifically 
distinguished between ordinary civil penalties and taxes.6 However, certain features of the 
Montana drug tax which led to its demise in Kurth Ranch are identical to the Utah 
administrative per se suspension: 
(T)his so-called tax is conditioned on the commission of a 
crime. . . That condition is significant of penal and prohibitory 
intent. . . (The tax) is exacted only after the taxpayer has been 
arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax 
obligation in the first place. Persons who have been arrested for 
possessing marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers 
subject to the Montana tax. 114 Sup.Ct. at 1947. 
The administrative suspension of a driver's license in Utah is similarly conditioned on the 
commission of the crime of DUI; the per se suspension is exacted only after the driver has 
been arrested for the precise conduct which leads to the attempted criminal prosecution, and 
persons who have been arrested for DUI constitute the entire class of drivers subject to the 
administrative suspension of their license. 
POINT H: THE SUSPENSION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE 
HAS BOTH DETERRENT AND RETRIBUTIVE 
EFFECTS AND IS THEREFORE PUNISHMENT 
DESPITE ANY REMEDIAL PURPOSE, CHARACTER 
OR EFFECT. 
6
 "Neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks 
this tax a form of punishment. . . Subjecting Montana's drug tax to Halper \s test for civil 
penalties is therefore inappropriate." 114 S. Ct. at 1946, 1948 (emphasis added). 
8 
The suspension of a driver's license has mixed effects. It is frequently argued 
that the administrative suspension has the remedial effect of removing potentially dangerous 
drivers from the road. This is expressed by the Legislature as follows: 
The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of this title relating 
to the suspension or revocation of a person's license or privilege 
to drive a motor vehicle for (DUI) is protecting persons on the 
highways by quickly removing those persons who have shown 
they are safety hazards. Sec. 53-3-222, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
as enacted by Laws, 1983 (Italics added). 
This section7 raises three significant points: 
1. The section does not say that the only purpose of the legislation (as required 
by Halper to save it from the label as punishment) is remedial. It does not 
even say that the primary purpose of the statute is remedial. It only says 
that one of the statute's primary purposes is quickly to remove the driver 
from the highway. 
2. The driver in question is not "quickly removed" from the highways even 
when the administrative suspension is enforced. Instead, although the 
driver's license is taken from the driver by the arresting officer, the driver 
is issued a temporary drivers license which permits the driver to continue 
to operate a vehicle on the roads of this state for a period of 29 days after 
7
 No written legislative history further explaining the legislative purpose of this section 
appears to exist, nor were audio tapes of comments made by proponents and opponents of the 
per se suspension legislation found to be of use in identifying any other purpose than that 
expressed in the statute itself However, it is not the legislative purpose which controls, but 
rather the effect of the legislation itself Halper. supra, at 443, 447-8. 
9 
the DUI arrest.8 
3. One of the mandatory criminal penalties for a conviction of DUI is identical 
to the administrative suspension;9 the criminal conviction requires that the 
Department suspend the driver's license for 90 days, the exact sanction 
provided in the administrative proceeding. 
Accordingly, the administrative suspension is punishment, even though the 
Legislature may have attempted to characterize it, in part, as remedial. The retributive effect 
of the administrative suspension is illustrated by a common occurrence in our system: the 
driver's license is suspended at the administrative hearing, but the criminal charge of DUI 
cannot for one reason or another be proven. Either the driver is acquitted, the charge is 
dismissed, or reduced to some lesser offense (typically "alcohol related reckless driving") 
which does not require suspension of the driver's license. In such a case retribution in the 
form of license suspension has been exacted administratively despite that it could not have 
been accomplished in the criminal case: 
If a defendant is found not guilty of driving while impaired, how 
do we explain the MVD suspension at that point? Do we 
apologize for the inconvenience? In some cases, persons lose 
their employment as a result of their license being suspended. 
In this context, the action could certainly be considered a 
punishment, and an unnecessary one at that. State of Arizona v. 
8
 Section 53-3-223, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1983, as amended. 
9
 Section 41-6-44(12), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1983, as amended. 
10 
Austin. 94 LWUSA 1177 (Flagstaff Munic. Ct. Coconino Cty. 
12/20/94). 
Besides retribution, a second characterization of punishment is deterrence. It 
cannot be disputed that the per se administrative suspension of a drivers license is also a 
powerfiil deterrent. The fact that under the present system, the State of Utah has not one, but 
two chances to suspend a driver's license is an obvious deterrent to driving under the 
influence, and a significant portion of that deterrence is attributable to the "extra" chance the 
State has because of the per se hearing. This procedure is unique. All other suspension of 
Utah driver's licenses depend on a criminal conviction for some specified offense, and no 
offense other than DUI affords the State two separate and unrelated opportunities to suspend 
the license. 
These retributive and deterrent effects of the administrative suspension 
procedure bring it squarely within the ambit of punishment as the Supreme Court has defined 
that term for double jeopardy purposes. State cases which hold to the contrary were all 
decided before the Supreme Court in Austin made its decision in Halper clearly applicable 
to condemn any civil sanction which has any element of deterrence or retribution. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that the United States Supreme Court considers that the 
existence of some remedial aspect will not save a civil sanction that has some retributive or 
deterrent effect: 
11 
(In Austin) The Court rejected the Government's assertion that 
the Eighth Amendment was not implicated because the statutes 
were, at least in part, remedial. Instead the Court indicated that 
'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, 
as we have come to understand that term. State v. A House and 
1.37 Acres. 886 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah per se administrative suspension procedure seeks to impose a civil 
sanction that has both deterrent and retributive effects Because of those aspects the 
procedure must be characterized as an attempt to impose punishment. The subsequent 
criminal prosecution is therefore barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Austin v. U.S.. 509 U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Halper. 
490 U.S. 435(1989). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ d a y of June, 1995. 
'D. EDMONDS 
torney for Appellants 
HN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on J u n e / ^ , 1995, I served the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief on opposing counsel by mailing, postage prepaid, two exact copies thereof to the 
following. 
TODD A. UTZINGER 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
EDMONDS 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Second Judicial Circuit Orders Denying Appellants' Motions to Dismis 
FLORENCE 
AND 
HUTCHISON 
PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
818 - » T H STREET 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
EXHIBIT 1 
JAY D. EDMONDS #957 
1660 Orchard Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: 484-3218 
and 
JOHN BLATR HUTCHISON #1607 
FLORENCE and HUTCHISON 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 399-9291 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL CmCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs -
BRET RAY ARBON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 
Judge 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having come before the Court for hearing 
on April 19, 1995, and the Court having read and considered the memoranda of each 
FLORENCE 
AND 
HUTCHISON 
PROFESSIONAL 
CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
S18 26TH STREET 
OGDEN UTAH 84401 
State of Utah v. Arbon 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 
party and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to Dismiss on the ground that this prosecution is 
barred by double jeopardy is DENIED. 
DATED this /f_ day of dfxJl , 1995. 
BY THE COURT. ^ . kj$v/ 
CIRCUIT/COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Moaon 
to Dismiss by mailing, postage prepaid, a copy thereof on the day of , 
1995 to the following: 
Susant Hunt 
Layton City Prosecutor 
425 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTTV OF DAVfS ) 
f 
r 
t. 
~
mz *y certify *fta2 *he annexacl ana 
- * "i <rje and "uli copy of tho 
" ^nohr proceedings on lile in 
;.SA C.rcujt CourL 
Daie^this^day <A(^2L^£. 19 </Ji 
7 , c^ 'J /> r~\ 
FLORENCE 
AND 
HUTCHISON 
ROtESSIONAL 
ORPORATION 
HTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
I - 26TH STREET 
DEN, UTAH 84401 
JAY D. EDMONDS #957 
1660 Orchard Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: 484-3218 
and 
JOHN BLAm HUTCHISON #1607 
FLORENCE and HUTCHISON 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 399-9291 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL CmCUIT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH WEBER 
Plaintiff, 
- vs -
KIMBERLY SUE MDLLIGAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 
Judge Roger Bean 
Defendant's motion to dismiss having come on regularly for hearing the 
17th day of April, 1995, and the parties having argued their respective positionss and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, NOW 
FLORENCE 
AND 
HUT CHISON 
PROFESSIONAL 
ORPORATION 
\TTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
8 - 26TII STREET 
.DEN, UTAH 84401 
South Weber v. Milligan 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss shall be 
and is hereby DENIED. 
-at 
DATED this j £ day of ttjtfJL , 1995. 
CIRCUIT JUDGE 
STATE OF UTAH ) CO <; WTY OF DAVIS ) W ' 
< tfc hereby certify thai the annexed and 
fceooing is a true and falf copy of ifte 
docLfronts and/or proceeding© on ffte ta 
the i.ayton Circuit Court 
Dated this v day of ^ > -
7\ 
J. «s ''$ 
..1©Ji. 
